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Abstract 
Interest group influence represents the Higgs boson of contemporary social research. Scholars 
have tried to define and measure influence for decades: tens of different definitions are used in 
the literature and as many methods to measure it can be found. The literature has recently 
converged towards an agreement on how to study interest group influence: preference 
attainment. The latter has monopolised the research in the literature in the last years. Yet, a 
discussion on what preference attainment is, what it does and what it does not is still missing in 
the literature. This works aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical and methodological 
informed discussion on interest group influence and preference attainment. In so doing, I propose 
a novel method to apply preference attainment in an effective and efficient manner. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The literature has slowly but ineluctably leaned towards preference attainment as the main way 
to investigate influence. Nonetheless, a discussion on what preference attainment is, what it is 
not and what its premises are is missing in the literature. In this work I define preference 
attainment as a theoretical approach to account for whether and to what extent policy outputs 
move towards interest groups’ preferences. This approach can be used to infer influence only in 
combination with different methods, such as large N observational studies or process tracing, 
which in turn rely on different modes of causal inference (see also Voltolini, 2016). Accordingly, 
preference attainment does not theoretically or empirically equal influence. In discussing the 
theoretical premises of preference attainment, I argue that it relies on a spatial conceptualisation 
of politics. Yet, the unspecified conceptualisation of the political space embraced by studies 
using this approach has so far significantly limited research. A more nuanced discussion on the 
premises underpinning preference attainment, such as the dimensionality and the alternative 
specification of the political space, allows me to introduce a new measure of preference 
attainment and a method to employ that measure. In this vein, I propose an ex-post methodology 
to the dimensionality of the political space and, more specifically, data reduction analysis as a 
method to measure preference attainment. The new theoretical and analytical tools are then 
applied to a case study in the last section, for illustrative purposes. 
WHAT PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT IS AND WHAT IS NOT 
First of all, preference attainment needs to be clearly defined. Preference attainment is not 
influence or a method to account for it, but it is a theoretical approach to analyse influence and it 
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needs a method to accomplish that. As a theoretical approach, it strongly relies on a spatial 
conceptualisation of politics.  
Preference attainment has become the mainstream approach to account for interest group 
influence. Scholars address interest group influence by applying preference attainment in several 
domains: US regulatory agencies (Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Yackee, 2004, 2006); US 
legislatures (Baumgartner et al, 2009; Gilens and Page, 2014; Mahoney, 2007); UK legislatures 
(Bernhagen, 2012) and the European Union (EU) (Klüver, 2013; Mahoney, 2007; Neuman et al, 
2002; Costa et al, 2014). This approach conceives the political space as determined by individual 
issues. The researcher identifies the political space which is usually represented by a piece of 
legislation which in turn bears costs and benefits for actors: policy proposals issued in the UK by 
Westminster (Bernhagen, 2012), in Brussels by the European Commission (Klüver, 2009; 
Klüver, 2013), and US bureaucratic rules (Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Yackee, 2004, 2006). 
Then, the researcher reduces the political space into dimensions and/or factors. Actors’ 
preferences on those dimensions/factors are either a priori assumed (Dür, 2008a) or inferred 
from data through interviews/surveys (Mahoney, 2007; Baumgartner et al, 2009; Bernhagen et 
al, 2014; Gilens and Page, 2014) and various documents (Klüver, 2011, 2013; Yackee and 
Yackee, 2006, Yackee, 2004, 2006; Costa et al, 2014) and the same is done for the initial and 
final policy outputs.1 Then, the researcher measures whether and to what extent the final policy 
output has moved towards the actors’ preferences. 
The term preference attainment was introduced in relation to interest group influence by 
Dür (2008b) as one of three main methods to measure influence along with attributed influence 
and process tracing. Two clarifications are needed for understanding the term. First, preference 
attainment is not a method like process tracing, as has been recently acknowledged in the 
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literature (Bernhagen et al, 2014). Indeed, both quantitative and qualitative studies (Neuman et 
al, 2002) can employ a preference attainment perspective. Studies of preference attainment can 
draw on ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ data such as respectively data derived from the coding of 
documents and personal estimates of preference attainment obtained through surveys or 
interviews (Bernhagen et al, 2014). In studies drawing on subjective data sources, the concept of 
attributed influence is common practice (Dür, 2008b; Dür, 2012; Klüver, 2013). Attributed 
influence is based on actors’ or experts’ perceptions of power relations.  
The second consideration concerns the difference between preference attainment and 
influence. The concept of preference attainment indicates whether and to what extent policy 
outputs move towards actors’ preferences, in other words, it indicates what Bernhagen et al 
(2014) term success. If the researcher aims to go beyond success and make claims about 
influence, defined as the causal link between interest groups’ actions and the direction and extent 
of policy change, a more nuanced discussion on causality is needed. The concept of causality has 
gained revamped attention in the new methodology literature (Gerring, 2008; Goldthorpe, 2001; 
Mahoney, 2010). Two main modes of causal inference may be identified in the analysis of 
interest group influence. Large N observational studies (Bernhagen, 2012; Klüver, 2009, 2013; 
Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Yackee, 2004, 2006) using data set observation data (Collier et al, 
2010a; Collier, 2011) rely on a frequentist mode of causal inference (Goldthorpe, 2001). Put 
simply, influence is conceived as the causal link between the interest group’s action and the 
policy change under analysis for which evidence is found in how frequently the former precedes 
the latter. Conversely, studies relying on process tracing (Bitton, 2002; Neuman et al, 2002) and 
causal process observations (Collier et al, 2010a, 2010b; Collier, 2011) are underpinned by a 
mechanismic mode of causal inference (see also Voltolini, 2016). A mechanismic mode of 
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causal inference relies on the in-depth description of the different causal steps linking the two 
variables (in this case the interest group’s action and policy change) with a strong emphasis on 
the sequence of those steps (Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2010). 
PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION  
Preference attainment is a theoretical approach to account for whether and to what extent the 
final policy output moves towards societal actors’ preferences. Then, by applying it in 
conjunction with different methods the researcher can infer influence. This section discusses the 
core tenet of preference attainment: the political space. In doing so, I highlight two main 
limitations which studies on interest group influence has so far imposed on preference 
attainment: the lack of the alternative specification and the unidimensionality of the political 
space. By relaxing those two limitations I respectively propose a new way to measure preference 
attainment and I introduce a method to employ that measure. 
Only very recently has the alternative specification received greater (but still partial) 
attention (Bernhagen et al, 2014). In line with the literature on spatial models of decision-
making, the analysis of preference attainment should also take into consideration two separate 
aspects: the status quo ante and the reference point. The latter refers to what happens if no policy 
change occurs. The reference point is defined by the literature on spatial decision-making as ‘the 
decision outcome that would occur if the legislative proposal were not adopted: in other words, 
the decision outcome in the event of failure to agree’ (Thomson, 2011: 41).  Conversely, the 
status quo ante refers to the situation in place before the initial policy output is issued.  
The measures proposed so far by the literature, even the most recent ones (Bernhagen  et 
al, 2014), do not take into consideration simultaneously the status quo and the reference point. 
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To address this gap, I propose two measures respectively for the status quo ante and the 
reference point. The first measure accounts for how much of the variation between the initial 
policy output and the status quo is in line with the interest group’s preferences. This measure 
increases the more the status quo is distant to the actor’s preferences and the closer the initial 
output is to the actor’s preferences. The second measure accounts for the extent to which the 
actor’s preferences are distant from the final policy output as well as from the reference point. It 
increases the more the reference point is distant from the actor’s preferences as well as the closer 
the final output is to actor’s preferences, in line with Dür (2012) and Bernhagen et al (2014).2 
The first measure is then to be subtracted from the second one in order to obtain a valid indicator 
of preference attainment. The difference between the status quo ante and the initial policy output 
needs to be controlled for. Otherwise, the measure will overestimate preference attainment. 
Preference attainment: (|𝐴1 − 𝑅𝑃| −  |𝐴1 − 𝑃2|) − (|𝐴1 − 𝑆𝑄| − |𝐴1 − 𝑃1|) 
- RP: reference point 
- SQ: status quo 
- P1 initial policy output 
- P2: final policy output 
- A1: actor’s preferences 
Figure 1 illustrates the two measures. As can be seen, in the first measure (the line at the bottom) 
the distance between the actor’s position (A1) and the status quo (SQ) is discounted for the 
distance between the actor’s position and the initial policy output (P1), (the dashed line). 
Similarly, in the second measure (the line at the top) the distance between the actor’s position 
(A1) and the reference point (RP) is discounted for the distance between the actor’s position and 
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the final policy output (P2), (the dashed line). In the case represented in Figure 1 the first 
measure is the distance between the status quo and the initial policy output whereas the second 
measure is the distance between the reference point and the final policy output. Figure 1 
represents the simplest scenario in which both the initial and the final policy outputs move away 
from respectively the status quo and the reference point towards the actor’s position. It should be 
noted that where the reference point coincides with the status quo (as it often happens) the 
preference attainment measure is reduced to the distance between the initial and the final policy 
output. 
(Figure 1)  
PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT AND DIMENSIONALITY 
The second theoretical assumption which the literature using preference attainment has 
embraced, but which should be relaxed in order to increase the validity of the analysis is 
unidimensionality. The strength of this spatial assumption varies greatly among studies, moving 
from those considering space in what Benoit and Laver (2012) call an orientational manner to 
explicitly spatial models of political competition. Nonetheless, even in the latter the political 
space is considered as being unidimensional, such as more or less regulation (Klüver, 2011, 
2013; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Yackee, 2004, 2006), the closeness to opposite interests (Costa 
et al, 2014) or the degree of approval on a proposal (Bernhagen, 2012). Also very recent attempts 
to rejuvenate the preference attainment concept (Bernhagen et al, 2014) still rely on the 
assumption of a one-dimensional political space. But other strands in political science, especially 
those focusing on party politics and voting behavior, have slowly but ineluctably come to the 
conclusion that ‘it is very common to need more than one dimension to describe key political 
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differences’ (Benoit and Laver, 2012: 195). The multi-dimensional spatial conception of political 
competition dates back to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and it has become standard practice in the 
US with the works on (roll call) voting behavior in Congress (McCarty et al, 2008; Poole,  2005; 
Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Then, this practice has moved to Europe both at national level with 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (Gabel and Hix, 2002; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Budge, 2001; 
Klingemann, 2006) and at the EU level with the project Resolving Controversy in the EU 
(Thomson et al, 2006, 2012; Thomson, 2011) and the study of the European Parliament’s party 
system (Bakker et al, 2012; Hix et al, 2006). The literature on interest group influence should 
follow these steps (see also Bunea and Ibenskas, 2016).  
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 
Two methodological approaches to dimensionality may be identified: a priori and ex post (De 
Vries and Marks, 2012; Benoit and Laver, 2012). Although both are ultimately theoretically 
driven (De Vries and Marks, 2012) and build on the assumption that some previous knowledge 
on the political space is always indispensable (Benoit and Laver, 2012), they underpin different 
conceptualisations of dimensionality, different research designs and often different findings. 
Works relying on process tracing have used spatiality in a mere metaphorical manner. As for 
large N observational studies, the methodological approach used has so far been an a priori one 
following methodological needs rather than theoretical guidance. The researcher identifies a 
dimension which is as externally valid as possible, for instance more regulation v. less regulation 
or the level of support for a proposal, and, then, he or she either implicitly (Bernhagen, 2012, 
Bernhagen et al, 2014; Costa et al, 2014) or explicitly (Klüver, 2011, 2013; Yackee and Yackee, 
2006; Yackee, 2004, 2006) chops that dimension into factors3.   
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An a priori methodological approach to dimensionality bears a major issue: the 
justification of dimensions in terms of exhaustiveness (Benoit and Laver, 2012). In other words, 
by using an a priori methodology the researcher cannot know whether the dimensions selected 
are exhaustive. An ex post methodological approach to dimensionality can solve this issue. Data 
reduction analysis is the main approach to find the dimensions of a political space ex post 
(Benoit and Laver, 2012; Kruskal, 1964; Rabinowitz, 1975; Weisberg, 1974). This methodology 
allows the researcher to estimate the number of dimensions by conceiving dimensions as clusters 
of factors on which the actors’ preferences co-vary (Benoit and Laver, 2012).  
Although several options to spatially represent data from an ex post perspective are 
available (van der Eijk and Rose, 2015) two have extensively been used so far: multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) and factor analysis (FA).4 FA is a latent variable model which investigates 
covariation between observed variables by identifying unobserved latent variables, namely the 
dimensions of the political space in this case. Yet, MDS is arguably the most appropriate method 
for studying preference attainment. As suggested by Benoit and Laver (2012: 213) ‘for a distance 
matrix of unknown dimensionality, MDS is the most common inductive method for mapping the 
positions of the parties’ and the same arguably holds true for interest groups. In fact, after the 
works on voting behavior in Congress have brought MDS into political science (McCarty et al, 
2008; Poole, 1990, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) it has started to be used in several domains, 
for instance the analysis of coalitions among societal actors (Wessels, 2004, 2005; Hausermann, 
2006; Thomson, 2011). Indeed, compared to FA, MDS is better able to account for 
dimensionality and, more specifically, to discriminate between unidimensionality and 
multidimensionality (Brazill and Grofman, 2002; van der Eijk and Rose, 2015). In MDS, 
correlated data on factors result in proximity in the space: a dimension is identified when the 
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distance between the actors’ preferences can be ordered onto that dimension (Kruskal, 1964; 
Weisberg, 1974). Conversely, FA represents correlations through angles between vectors: ‘a 
correlation of zero would be displayed by 90ᵒ separation between the lines connecting the 
variables’ points with the origin […] A single dimension is found if variables covary perfectly, 
which is to say if the variables are identical to one another except for linear transformation’ 
(Weisberg, 1974: 766). This in turn bears a side effect: FA uses a fictitious dimension to 
calculate angles (Weisberg, 1974) thus sometimes identifying more dimensions than those with 
substantive meanings.  
PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT AND THE DIRECTIVE BANNING TOBACCO 
ADVERTISEMENT  
This section applies both these theoretical and methodological propositions to a case: the EU 
Directive banning tobacco advertisement. This case is illustrative for how to apply an ex post 
methodology and, more specifically, a data reduction method to measure preference attainment. 
The procedure shown below can be employed both in single case studies and large N 
observational studies as a measure of preference attainment and to infer interest group influence. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASE 
In 1984 the European Council invited the Commission to use its right of initiative to regulate 
tobacco control leading to the 1987 Europe Against Cancer (EAC) program (Boessen and 
Maarse, 2009). The Commission adopted a proposal in 1991 that included a total ban on cross-
border advertisement and sponsorship of tobacco products. The following year the European 
Parliament (EP) voted in favor of this proposal, but the Health Council blocked it. In the 
Council, a blocking minority consisting of Germany, UK, Netherlands and periodically Denmark 
 11 
  
and Greece (Bitton, 2002) continued striking down this proposal until 1997. 1995 and 1997 were 
crucial years in that the EU enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden and the shift in the UK 
from a Conservative to a Labour government changed the dynamics within the Council. As a 
consequence, a blocking minority was no longer present and, in 1998, the directive passed, 
including all forms of advertisement (and not only the cross-border ones, as in the 1992 
proposal), as result of several amendments from the EP (Bitton, 2002; Neuman et al, 2002).  
MEASURING PREFERENCES 
I identified and coded the actors’ preferences and the content of the legislative acts through a 
manual content analysis of primary sources5: the list is provided in the online appendix. I also 
relied on the extensive secondary sources on this case (Adamini et al, 2011; Bitton, 2002; 
Boessen and Maarse, 2009; Neuman et al, 2002). Then, I manually coded the preferences of the 
actors involved6, the policy outputs, the reference point and the status quo ante according to five 
factors7. Table 1 shows the results of the coding. The five factors are: EU intervention, strength 
of regulation (i.e. soft law or hard law), the forms of advertisement covered by regulation (i.e. 
any form of advertisement or only those with cross-border effects), sponsorship (i.e. included or 
not) and advertisement targets (i.e. only people under eighteen or everyone). Those factors 
represent the issues on which the debate focused according to primary and secondary sources.  
(HERE: Table 1) 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION AND DIMENSIONALITY 
The 1991 European Commission proposal represents the initial policy output and the 1998 
Directive the final one. As for the alternative specification, the failure of the proposal would 
 12 
  
have likely resulted into a soft law approach, such as the 1989 resolution on smoking in public 
places (Bitton, 2002). This scenario would have been different with respect to the status quo 
ante, which is represented by the absence of EU regulation. Not only are these two concepts 
theoretically different, as suggested above, but they also elicit different empirical implications 
with respect to actors’ preferences. Indeed, the tobacco industry favored regulation at EU level, 
if in the form of soft law: this would have sent a signal on the eagerness of the industry to 
regulate tobacco advertisement along with its good faith, preventing also future stronger 
regulation at EU level. Conversely, the health lobby preferred the status quo ante to the lost 
occasion of regulating advertisement at EU level with hard law: a soft law approach would have 
constrained future regulation jeopardising the possibility of stronger regulation. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the political space takes a two dimensional character. First of 
all, the analysis shows that the second dimension significantly increases the validity of the 
political space. More specifically, I calculate Eigenvalues, which account for how much the 
covariation between data on different factors is accounted for by the identified dimensions. By 
adding the second dimension the exhaustiveness of the political space increases significantly, 
from 85.18 to 95.95. An interesting aspect is how to interpret the dimensions. As mentioned 
above, prior knowledge of the political space under analysis is indispensable also when using an 
ex post methodological approach to dimensionality. In this case, the researcher should not be 
surprised to detect two dimensions which can be reconciled to the form of regulation on tobacco 
advertisement (Y axis) and EU intervention along with its strength (X axis). Those two 
dimensions are recurrent in studies on European party politics and public opinion: pro-European 
integration v. anti-European integration and social left v. social right (Hooghe et al, 2002; 
Bakker et al, 2012). Furthermore, this interpretation is also supported by the knowledge of the 
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case under analysis. The debate between material and post-material values, namely what have 
been called the political economy and public health frames, represents the traditional dimensions 
on which national debates on tobacco control have been based in the last decades (Cairney, 2009, 
Cairney et al, 2012; Frankenberg, 2004; Gruning et al, 2008; Marmor and Lieberman, 2004; 
Studlar, 2007, 2009, 2010). Nonetheless, this dimension has been associated with another one in 
Europe: whether EU should regulate on this area or not and how. Indeed, the tobacco industry 
has always challenged the legal capacity of the EU to legislate in this area favoring a soft law 
approach at EU level, such as the voluntary agreement mentioned above (Bitton et al, 2002; 
Neuman et al, 2002).  
 
(Figure 2)  
MEASURING PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT 
The next step is to use the measure for preference attainment introduced above in order to 
analyze which actor has been more successful. The distance between the tobacco industry’s 
preferences and the reference point is approximately 0.742, which must be discounted for the 
distance between the tobacco industry’s preferences and the final policy outcome, which is 
approximately 1.4048. The result is a negative number, namely -0.662. The difference between 
the distance from tobacco industry preferences to the status quo and the one to the initial policy 
output is almost nil, namely 0.035. Accordingly, the measure of preference attainment for the 
tobacco industry is -0.697: the tobacco industry has not seen its preferences attained. Rather, the 
final policy output moved away from its preferences. Conversely, results show that the health 
lobby has seen its preferences attained. To simplify, Figure 2, illustrates only the measures 
associated with the health lobby. The health lobby’s preferences are distant from the reference 
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point and almost coincidental with the final policy output: the difference between the two 
distances is 1.514 (equivalent to the first distance). In Figure 2 this is represented by the arrow 
linking the reference point with the final policy output. Furthermore, the difference between the 
distance from the health lobby’s preferences to the status quo and to the initial policy output is 
1.485. This is represented in Figure 2 by the solid part of the arrow linking the status quo to the 
health lobby’s preferences. The measure of preference attainment for the health lobby is 0.029. 
In conclusion, the health lobby was more successful than the tobacco industry, namely the final 
policy moved closer to its preferences9. 
CONCLUSION 
In this work I emphasise what is preference attainment and what is not, what its main features are 
and how we can progress it. Preference attainment is defined as a theoretical approach to account 
for influence, which is based on a strongly spatial conceptualisation of politics. In this vein, the 
political space needs to be taken seriously. The researcher must take into consideration the 
dimensionality and the alternative specification of the political space. In other words, the 
researcher must investigate preference attainment taking also into consideration what was the 
situation before that issue was on the agenda as well as what would have happened if the piece of 
legislation had not passed. Furthermore, attention needs to be paid to dimensionality and the 
implications it bears on actors’ preferences. In order to address those two issues I firstly propose 
a new measure of preference attainment and then a new method to apply that measure. In the 
final section of this work I apply what proposed in a case study, for illustrative purposes.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 In Klüver (2009) the initial policy output is the Commission proposal issued before the consultations with stakeholders and the 
final policy output is the adopted proposal. Similarly, in Bernhagen (2012) the initial policy output is the government policy 
proposal and the final one is the enacted legislation. 
2 The measure used in this section for the reference point is what Bernhagen et al (2014) term improvement to reversion point. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that I build on that measure only to account for the distance between the actor’s position and the 
reference point, as their measure does not take into consideration the status quo. 
3 An example of an explicit a priori approach can be found in Klüver’s (2009) (see, for instance, Table 1 on p. 541).  
4 Another option is Item Response Theory (IRT), initially used to analyse surveys and questionnaires and then adopted in several 
other fields. 
5 Documents providing information for actors’ preferences and policy outcomes can be analysed through various methods, such 
as (manual or computer assisted) content analysis and discourse analysis 
6 Future applications of this approach should consider individual interest groups and derive coalitions empirically with MDS and 
not assuming them a priori as done in this section. Furthermore, the positions of institutional actors, such as the EP and individual 
member states in this case, can also be included in the analysis, as done in the Resolving Controversy in the EU project 
(Thomson, 2011). Nonetheless, the simplicity of the analysis is functional to the illustrative purposes of this work.  
7 As mentioned above, it should be noted that in ex post methodologies the choice of factors (but not dimensions) is theoretically 
driven. 
8 It should be noted that the reference point would be much closer to the tobacco industry preferences if only the dimension ‘EU 
intervention’ was taken into consideration. 
9 This conclusion needs to be taken with caution. The analysis in this section is for illustrative purposes only and it does not take 
into considerations several important aspects of the case under analysis, such as the fact that the directive was blocked for seven 
years in the Council. 
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Table 1: Coding of Interest Groups’ Preferences and Policy Outputs 
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1991 
Commission 
Proposal 
1 1 0 1 1 
1998 
Directive 
1 1 1 1 1 
Status Quo 0 0 0 0 0 
Reference 
Point 
1 0 0 0 1 
Tobacco 
Industry 
1 0 1 0 1 
Health Lobby 1 1 1 1 1 
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Figure 1: Preference Attainment 
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Figure 2: Multi-dimensional Scaling 
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